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Abstract
Firm shutdown creates a turbulent situation for workers as it leads directly to layoffs for
its workers. An additional consideration is whether a firm’s shutdown within an industry
creates turbulence for workers at other continuing firms. Using data drawn from the
Longitudinal Worker File, a Canadian firm-worker matched employment database, we
investigate the impact of industry shutdown rates on workers at continuing firm. This
paper exploits variation in shutdown rates across industries and within an industry over
time to explain the rate of permanent layoffs and the growth of workers’ earnings. We
find an increase in industry shutdown rates increases the probability of permanent
layoffs and decreases earnings growth for workers at continuing firms.
JEL Classification: J24, J31, J63, C35
Keywords: Worker separation, Firm survival, Selection
1 Introduction
The fortunes of firms and workers are inextricably linked. Firm shutdown results in dis-
placement of workers through layoffs. Firm turnover creates uncertainty for workers
by affecting their employment status and wages. These first-round effects have nega-
tive consequences for the laid-off workers of the shutting down firms. When examining
firm shutdown within an industry and its impact on workers, industry shutdown rates
also provide an indication of the state of an industry. If industry shutdown rates cap-
ture industry wide shocks and fluctuations, then industry shutdown rates may also tell
us something about the fortunes of workers at continuing firms. Negative shocks within
an industry cause firm profits to fall, which results in rising shutdown rates. Further, the
falling demand also causes layoffs at continuing firms to rise, as these firms must reduce
production and shed costs. The issue becomes whether industry shutdown rates capture
turbulence and fluctuations within an industry, which spill over to cause second-round
layoffs at the continuing firms.
This paper empirically investigates the effect of industry shutdown rates on the prob-
ability of worker layoffs at continuing firms and, by extension, earnings growth of these
laid-off workers. A firm’s exit or shutdown results in separations as the firm must lay off
its worker. The purpose of this paper is not to consider these direct effects of firm shut-
down on worker outcomes. Rather, we look at whether industry shutdown rates contain
© The Author(s). 2017 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the
Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Huynh et al. IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2017) 6:7 Page 2 of 31
information indirectly relevant for layoff probabilities and earnings of workers at contin-
uing firms. We focus on industry shutdown rates as its impact on workers receives little
attention in the literature. This paper addresses the impact of industry shutdown rates by
examining the questions: (i) does the industry shutdown rates affect workers at continu-
ing firms; (ii) how does the industry shutdown rate affect workers at continuing firms; and
(iii) what are the future earnings prospects of workers experiencing a permanent layoff
from a continuing firm? Understanding the labor market interaction of firms and workers
requires access to firm-worker matched datasets.1 Our study utilizes one such Canadian
administrative employer-employee dataset called the Longitudinal Worker File (LWF).2
Earnings growth allows us to look at the future prospects of laid-off workers. This
analysis captures the intensive margin of associated with layoffs. Using administrative
data on workers in the USA, von Wachter et al. (2009) find that the annual earn-
ings of workers in relative stable jobs experiencing a surprise layoff during the 1982
recession are still 20% lower than their nondisplaced counterparts after more than
20 years. Using Canadian data, Morissette R et al. (2007) find that mass layoffs due
to firm closure have a greater impact on more senior workers. Further, Song and
von Wachter (2014) show that the long-term nonemployment rate increase is similar
across recessions in the past 30 years. However, they find the long-term unemploy-
ment rate increase is higher in the 2008 recession than in previous recessions. These
studies demonstrate that layoffs, especially mass layoffs typically occurring during reces-
sions, have long-term consequences for the earnings and employment prospects of
displaced workers.3
Our study is similar to Quintin and Stevens (2005a, b), who investigate the impact of
industry exit rates on firm-worker separation rates using cross-sectional French data.
However, three additional aspects of the LWF database allow us to build on these previ-
ous studies. First, the LWF database classifies separations as (i) voluntary separation when
a worker quits or an involuntary separation as a result of a layoff and (ii) permanent or
temporary. The data used in Quintin and Stevens (2005a, b) only identifies worker sepa-
rations with no classification on type of separation. Due to these data limitations, Quintin
and Stevens (2005a, b) focus on explanations for worker separations related to the work-
ers choice to leave the firm. In contrast, the LWF database allows us to empirically analyze
the firm’s decision to separate from workers through permanent layoffs.
The second aspect is that the LWF is a longitudinal database, while the third aspect
is that the LWF contains worker earnings information. Unlike the data in Quintin and
Stevens (2005a, b), the longitudinal aspect of the LWF database allows us to exploit vari-
ation in industry shutdown rates both across industries and within an industry over time
and also allows us to follow workers over time. As the empirical specifications includes
industry dummy variables as controls, the analysis focuses on the within industry vari-
ation in shutdown rates. Using the longitudinal worker information, this paper provides
further analysis of the growth rate of individual worker earnings following a permanent
layoff.
The findings of our study are4:
1. Industry shutdown rates have a positive and significant effect on the probability of
a permanent layoff at continuing firms. The impact of industry shutdown rates on
the probability of a permanent layoff captures the extensive margin or the number
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of affected workers. For men, a 1% increase in industry shutdown rates means
approximately a 0.13% increase in the probability of a worker layoff. For women,
the marginal effect can be negative or positive and ranges from −0.01% at extra
small-sized (less than 5 employees) firms to 0.11% at small-sized firms (5 to 19
employees).
2. The effect of industry shutdown rates on earnings growth is generally negative for
both laid-off men and women. The exceptions include men at medium-sized firms
and women at small-sized firms. The impact of industry shutdown rates on
individual workers through wage growth captures an intensive margin.
3. For workers experiencing a permanent layoff, their post-layoff wage prospects vary
with the size of firm at which they eventually find employment. Most laid-off
workers moving to a larger firm see their wages increase, while most laid-off
workers moving to a smaller firm see their wages fall.
The first result extends the finding of Quintin and Stevens (2005b). Quintin and Stevens
(2005a, b) are not able to distinguish between layoffs and quits. They focus on workers
voluntarily leaving continuing firms to explain the positive relationship between worker
separation rates and industry shutdown rates. Our first finding indicates that layoff rates
at continuing firms also increase with industry shutdown rates. Therefore, models of
worker turnover must capture both workers choosing to quit firms and firms choosing
to lay off workers when investigating worker separations in the context of industry fluc-
tuations. The second result also extends the previous work by demonstrating that rising
industry shutdown rates also cause deterioration of the earnings prospects for laid-off
workers. However, the final result shows that someworkers do find “good” jobs after expe-
riencing a layoff, which allows them to increase their earnings. Thus, a layoff need not
necessarily result in a “bad” outcome for a displaced worker.
These results demonstrate the necessity of the joint analysis of firm shutdown with
either permanent layoff or worker wages. Industry shutdown rates provide a measure of
firm turnover or churn within an industry. Exogenous conditions within an industry, such
things as cyclical movements or demand decline, cause profits of firms to change. The
typical view of the firm in economics is that falling profits for firms within an industry
lead to firm shutdown and possible exit. Thus, increasing shutdown rates indicate falling
profits within an industry. For continuing firms, direct and indirect effects on employ-
ment result when moving to a new equilibrium. With these falling profits, output falls at
continuing firms, which leads directly to worker layoffs. Indirect effects occur for contin-
uing firms for two reasons. First, they now face less competition with greater shutdown of
competitors. Second, more workers are available to hire with the shutdown of competi-
tors. Continuing firms are now better able to substitute for current workers as new hires
are cheaper (see Farber (1999)). Direct effects of falling profits result in increased layoffs
at continuing firms and, by extension, lower earnings for laid-off workers. Indirect effects
are ambiguous.
Recent research suggests that, in the case of involuntary separations, there are large dif-
ferences in the income losses associated with differences in human capital. Kambourov
and Manovskii (2009) argue that many skills acquired by workers during their working
careers are job-specific. Job displacement is especially detrimental to those workers with
job-specific skills not easily transferable. Davis and Wachter (2011) provide an extensive
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review of the literature on the effects of large cyclical movements in job displacement and
how worker anxieties about job loss, wage cuts, and job opportunities respond to con-
temporaneous economic conditions. They find that the job loss as a result of mass layoffs
results in a loss of earnings results in roughly 1.4 to 2.8 years of pre-displacement earn-
ings (depending on the current unemployment rate). This macroeffect is of first-order
importance. However, there are spillover effects of mass layoffs.5
Gathmann et al. (2017) exploit regional variation to find spillover effects of mass layoffs
are about 35% of local employment losses stem from spillover effects in plants not directly
affected by the mass layoff (55% after a decade). In our analysis, we are not able to use
regional variations but rather rely on the industry shutdown rate as a proxy for industry
variation. Depending on the firm size class of a worker, we compute that there is an annual
earnings loss of between 10 and 60% for laid-off men and 20 to 60% for laid-off women as
a result of a 1% increase in the shutdown rate.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following fashion: the LWF (firm-worker
matched) dataset is described in Section 2 while Section 3 provides an empirical model
of permanent layoffs which discusses the issue of selection due to firm survival. Section 4
discusses the effect of firm shutdown rates on workers’ earnings. Finally, Section 5
concludes.
2 The Longitudinal Worker File
Our data are from the Longitudinal Worker File (LWF). The LWF is an annual adminis-
trative dataset from 1983 onwards and contains a 10% random sample of Canadians who
either filed a tax return (T1 form) or received a statement of remuneration (T4 form).
Appendix A gives a brief description of the LWF data sources and its construction. The
LWF has information on individuals’ earnings, demographics, and occupation, as well as
on the the firm of employment. LWF’s matched employer-employed structure allows for
examining workers’ mobility, turnover, and earnings dynamics.
Our sample consists of individuals living in the 10 Canadian provinces who are between
25 and 64 years of age. The source of firm-level information is the Longitudinal Employ-
ment Analysis Program (LEAP) database. Given that the LWF and LEAP databases
contain common firm identifiers, firm information from the LEAP database is linkable to
the worker in the LWF database. LEAP contains annual employment information on firms
with at least one dollar in payroll in a given year from 1991 to 2008. The LEAP payroll
information allows the identification in year t of continuing firms with a positive payroll
versus temporarily or permanently (exit) firm shutdown with a zero payroll. Industry j’s
shutdown rate in year t, SRjt , is
SRjt = SDj,t+1/Njt (1)
where SDj,t+1 gives the total number of firms in industry j with a positive payroll in year
t and a zero payroll in period t + 1 and Njt gives the total number of firms with in indus-
try j positive payroll in period t. The structure of the LEAP database implies that firm
shutdown is not due to merger or acquisition activity. Table 1 provides the list of the 39
industries in the data. LEAP assigns a NAICS code to each firm from 1992 onwards6. We
restrict our sample of workers to the period from 1992 to 2007 since the analysis uses firm
and NAICS information taken from the LEAP database.
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Table 1 Industry classification by NAICS
Industry NAICS
Crop and animal production 111, 112
Forestry and logging; fishing, hunting, and trapping 113–115
Oil and gas extraction 211
Mining (except oil and gas) 212
Support activities for mining and oil and gas extraction 213
Utilities 22
Construction 23
Food manufacturing; beverage and tobacco product manufacturing 311, 312
Textile mills; textile product mills 313, 314
Clothing manufacturing; leather and allied product manufacturing 315, 316
Wood product manufacturing 321
Paper manufacturing 322
Printing and related support activities 323
Chemical manufacturing 325
Plastic and rubber product manufacturing 326
Nonmetallic mineral product manufacturing 327
Primary metal manufacturing 331
Fabricated metal product manufacturing 332
Machinery manufacturing 333
Computer and electronic product manufacturing 334
Electrical equipment, appliance, and component manufacturing 335
Transportation equipment manufacturing 336
Furniture and related product manufacturing 337
Miscellaneous manufacturing 339
Wholesale trade 41
Retail trade 44–45
Air, rail, water, touristic, and support transportation 481–483, 487, 488
Truck transportation 484
Transit and ground passenger transportation 485
Warehousing and storage 493
Publishing; information services and data processing services 511, 516, 518, 519
Motion picture and sound recording industries 512
Broadcasting and telecommunication 515, 517
Finance and insurance; real estate and rental and leasing 52, 53
Professional, scientific, and technical services 54
Administrative and support services 561
Arts, entertainment, and recreation 71
Accommodation and food services 72
Other services (except public administration) 81
Note: The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) is a standard classification used by Statistics Canada to classifying
business establishments for the purpose of collecting, analyzing, and publishing statistical data. More information is available at
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/concepts/industry-industrie-eng.htm
A separation occurs in year t, if t is the last year of an individual’s tenure in firm j (i.e., the
end of a job spell). The LWF database allows for the categorization of employee-employer
separations. Quits and layoffs are two such categories. Layoffs are further broken into
temporary, worker subject to recall, and permanent, worker not subject to recall subcat-
egories. These categories allow for the creation of dummy variables. The value of a given
separation dummy variable is 1 for any type of the given separation, including, but not
limited to, quits and layoffs. For example, the value of the layoff variable is 1 if the Record
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of Employment (ROE) states that the shortage of work is the reason for the separation,
i.e., layoff.
2.1 Summary statistics
Table 2 provides summary statistics across industries. There is industry heterogeneity in
terms of (i) workers’ characteristics of age, gender, tenure, and earnings and (ii) industry
characteristics of shutdown rate, permanent layoff rate, number of firms, and number of
workers. The age range of average worker varies from a low of 37.8 years in the motion
picture and recording industry to a high of 44.0 years in the primary metal manufacturing
industry. Women dominate clothing manufacturing and leather and allied manufactur-
ing at 76% of workers but only constitute 10% of workers in mining. Tenure ranges from
3.81 years in administrative and support services to 11.45 years in primary metal manu-
facturing. Average earnings are the highest in oil and gas extraction at $107,090 per year
while earnings in accommodation and food services are $18,800 per year on average. The
shutdown rate is the highest in utilities at 16.1% and the lowest in fabricated metal prod-
uct manufacturing at 7.4%. Forestry has the highest permanent layoff rate 12.4%, while oil
extractions has the lowest at 1.5%.
Table 3 provides summary statistics on worker characteristics across five firm size
classes. We define firm size groupings as (i) extra small (XS)—less than 5 employees; (ii)
small (S)—5–19 employees; (iii) medium (M)—20–99 employees; (iv) large (L)—100–500
employees; and (v) extra large (XL)—greater than 500 employees. XS size class firms have
workers with the lowest tenure and earnings relative to the other size classes, but these
firms experience the highest shutdown rates. The permanent layoff rate is the highest for
the firm size classes XS, S, and M at around 5%. L size class firms have a 3.7% layoff rate,
while XL firms have a 2% layoff rate.
Table 4 provides summary statistics for worker characteristics across five regions: (1)
Atlantic provinces—Newfoundland, New Brunswick Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward
Island; (2) Quebec; (3)Ontario; (4) Prairie provinces—Alberta, Saskatchewan, andManitoba;
and (5) British Columbia. Across the regions, average age, proportion of men versus
women, and exit rate are similar. The eastern Canadian regions of the Atlantic provinces,
Quebec, and Ontario tend to have longer tenure rates compared to the Prairie provinces
and British Columbia. Wage rates range from an average high of $45,780 in Ontario to a
low of $29,710 in the Atlantic provinces. The opposite occurs for layoff rate as the Atlantic
provinces have the highest permanent layoff rate of 6.7% and Ontario has lowest at 3%.
2.2 Comparison of continuing and shutting down firms
One issue to consider when investigating the impact of industry shutdown rates onworker
layoff rate is that workers may choose to quit in anticipation of deteriorating indus-
try conditions in order to avoid any negative consequences of being laid off. A worker
may quit in anticipation of being laid off or firm shutdown. This may create a possible
selection bias when investigating firm layoffs of workers. Given that a random sample
of workers forms the basis of the LWF database, we observe separations for workers in
the LWF sample but do not observe separations rates at the firm level. Therefore, we are
unable to determine quit rates in the years prior to a firm’s shutdown. However, the data
contain a measure of firm employment which allows us to look at overall employment
activity at firms.
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Table 3 Summary statistics by size of firms
Firm size Age Gender Tenure Earnings SR PL Firms Workers
XS 41.8 0.47 4.83 25,710 0.130 0.050 110,540 125,795
S 40.4 0.42 5.17 32,100 0.128 0.054 83,935 136,195
M 40.1 0.39 5.34 37,960 0.124 0.049 47,845 176,875
L 40.3 0.39 5.83 43,330 0.120 0.037 7825 128,875
XL 40.9 0.41 7.77 51,040 0.121 0.020 1475 321,260
Note: The firm size classes are (1) less than 5 employees, (2) 5–19 employees, (3) 20–99 employees, and (4) greater than or equal
to 100 employees. SR is the shutdown rate while PL is the permanent layoff rate
Figure 1 presents the median employment size and growth for firms in their last 3 years
prior to shutdown. As a comparison, the figure also presents median employment size
and growth for rival continuing firms over a similar 3-year window. Continuing firms tend
to be larger and have higher growth than shutting down firms. The median employment
size and growth both tend to be flat for continuing firms. Alternatively, shutting firms
experience a drop in size and increasingly negative growth as shutdown approaches.
Tables 5 and 6 provide these comparisons between continuing and shutting down and
firms across the industries. Similar results occur at the industry level. The shedding of
workers, whether through layoffs or quits, appears to occur in the years leading to firm
shutdown.
3 Permanent layoffs—extensivemargin
Industry shutdown rates measure the short-run performance of firms within an indus-
try. High shutdown rates indicate firms within an industry deem that shutdown is more
profitable than continuing operations. The implication of shutdown is that a firm must
become profitable or eventually exit. One method to reduce costs is worker layoffs. These
layoffs can be temporary or permanent depending on circumstances. Temporary layoffs
may lead to permanent layoffs in the long run if the firm eventually exits or workers are
not recalled.
Thus, our analysis focuses on permanent layoffs by firms as amethod to analyze the pro-
cess of shedding workers. We consider the effects of industry shutdown rates along with
the other controls to assess the qualitative and quantitative impacts of industry conditions
on a firm’s decision to permanently layoff workers.
We identify shutdowns in year t as those firms transitioning from a positive payroll in
year t to a zero payroll in year t + 1.
A firm’s shutdown does not imply an exit, as the firm may have a positive payroll in
some future period. Our focus on anticipated separations motivates the choice of shut-
down rates. The absence of a positive annual payroll in year t signals at least a year-long
Table 4 Summary statistics by region
Region Age Gender Tenure Earnings SR PL Firms Workers
Atlantic 40.7 0.42 6.47 29,710 0.127 0.067 19,535 61,775
Quebec 41.0 0.41 6.52 36,170 0.124 0.042 63,165 213,585
Ontario 40.7 0.43 6.30 45,780 0.122 0.030 86,550 350,570
Prairies 40.4 0.41 5.67 41,720 0.126 0.034 44,830 147,625
BC 40.9 0.42 5.79 41,070 0.127 0.043 37,520 115,445
Note: The five regions are (1) Atlantic provinces, (2) Quebec, (3) Ontario, (4) Prairie provinces, and (5) British Columbia. SR is the
shutdown rate while PL is the permanent layoff rate
Huynh et al. IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2017) 6:7 Page 10 of 31
Fig. 1 Comparison of shutdown and continuing firms. Note: This graph provides a comparison between
shutting down firms in year t with continuing firms. For these two groups of firms, the graph provides the
median employment size and growth rate in 3 years prior to firm shutdown in the former group. For a full
comparison by industry, see Tables 5 and 6
closure. From the worker’s point of view, there is little difference whether or not his/her
firm reopens in some future year following shutdown. In either case, the firm’s workers
anticipate prolonged separations and adjust their labor market decisions. Shutdowns are
also more easily identified in the data than firm exits since they only require the knowl-
edge of the firm’s payroll in two consecutive periods. For the analysis, we perform separate
analysis for men and women and across firms in different size classes. We analyzed the
pooled data but found the assumption of homogeneity of effects across men and women
is rejected statistically and economically.7
3.1 Selection issues and identification strategy
A selection issue arises as the permanent layoff decisions are only observable for contin-
uing firms in year t. In the remainder of the paper, we will refer to continuing firms to
indicate those firms not experiencing a shutdown at year t. To account for the selection
bias, we consider two separate dichotomous variables and allow for correlated distur-
bances. For worker i at firm k in industry j at time t, we estimate a bivariate probit model.
The continuing firm (FS) equation accounts for firm selection and the permanent layoff
(PL) equation captures a worker’s outcome or the probability of a permanent layoff, which
gives the following bivariate probit worker selection (BPWS) model:
FS∗ikjt = αFS + βFSSRjt + γ FSBit +
J∑
j=1
ψFSj Ij +
2002∑
t=1993
δFSt Dt + λZkjt + vikjt ,
PL∗ikjt = αPL + βPLSRjt + γ PLBit +
J∑
j=1
ψPLj Ij +
2002∑
t=1993
δPLt Dt + uikjt . (2)
vikjt ,uikjt ∼ N(μ,),μ =
[
0
0
]
, =
[
1 ρ
ρ 1
]
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The sample includes only continuing workers or workers experiencing a permanent lay-
off. Thus, the indicator variable, PLikjt , equals 1 if a worker experiences a permanent layoff
with PL∗ikjt ≥ 0 and 0 if a worker continues employment. A second indicator variable,
FSikjt , equals 1 if a firm remains active with FS∗ikjt ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise. SRjt is the annual
shutdown rate in industry j in period t. The PL equation includes individual-, firm-, and
industry-specific control variables: (i) Bit is a set of worker including an age categories,
marital status, job tenure and tenure squared, region of residence, union membership,
and earnings in period year t−1; (ii) Ij is industry-specific dummy variables; and (iii)Dt is
a set of year-specific dummy variables. We break the sample of workers into subsamples
for estimation purposes based on their firm’s employment size. The FS equation includes
all the relevant variables from PL equation but with Zkjt as the exclusion restrictions both
at the firm (k) and industry (j) levels. For a technical discussion of this method, please
refer to Maddala (1983).
3.2 Identification strategy
The BPWS model given in Eq. 2 identifies the impact of selection in two ways: (1) the
correlation parameter (ρ) of the joint model and (2) using exclusion restrictions of vari-
ables (Zjt). The correlation parameter achieves identification through functional form.
Han and Vytlacil (2017) prove that identification is achievable in bivariate models with-
out exclusion restrictions (i.e., instruments) if there are common exogenous regressors
in both equations. They also show that having an exclusion restriction is necessary and
sufficient for identification in these models without common exogenous variables but is
sufficient only in models with common exogenous covariates.
The second method requires at least one variable that affects whether a firm continues
or not but not whether a worker experiences a permanent layoff or not, contemporane-
ously. There are two exclusion restrictions. The first exclusion restriction is the use of
industry-level US-Canada bilateral real exchange rate:
RERjt = PUSjt /PCDNjt × et , (3)
where PUSjt is the US industry gross output price index, PCDNjt is the Canada industry
gross output price index and et is the nominal bilateral exchange rate between Canadian
and USA in year t. The choice of RERjt as the exclusion restriction is motivated by the
fact that the USA is the major trading partner of Canada. The real exchange rate affects
Canadian export and import propensities with the USA. Short-run profits of Canadian
firms likely fluctuate with export/import propensities. Thus, real exchange rate move-
ments likely affect the probability of whether a Canadian firm continues to operate or
temporarily shutdown; see for example Huynh et al. (2010). For employment, the impact
of exchange rates differs. Huang et al. (2014) provide empirical evidence that exchange
rate movements have little effect on manufacturing employment and no effect on non-
manufacturing employment in Canada for the period 1994 to 2010. Commodity prices
and exchange rate movements are tied together. The authors show that commodity
price movements are a main driver to employment changes in manufacturing resulting
from exchange rate movements. Further, Campa and Goldberg (2001) show that the real
exchange rate movements for the USA have effects on wages and hours worked but have
negligible effects on total employment and number of jobs. Based on these empirical
findings, we argue that fluctuations of the real exchange rate is correlated with firm exit
Huynh et al. IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2017) 6:7 Page 16 of 31
rates but are unlikely to affect the contemporaneous probability a worker experiences a
permanent separation.
The second exclusion restriction is a relative firm-to-industry variable.We compute the
logarithm of the ratio of the wage bill of firm k at time t relative to the average wage bill
of firms in industry j and size class s at time t or:
logwage billkjst = log
(wage billkjst
wage billjst
)
. (4)
This variable is strongly correlated with whether a firm continues operations, as it
proxies for how competitive a firm is relative to its industry peers. Controlling for
the employment size of a firm, the relative wage bill provides a measure of firm effi-
ciency/productivity within an industry. More productive firms pay higher wages and,
thus, have a higher wage bill as discussed in Abowd et al. (1999), Michelacci and Quadrini
(2009) and Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012). More productive firms with higher wage
bills should be more likely to continue operations. However, the contemporaneous rela-
tive wage bill of a firm is unlikely to contain information about worker layoff probabilities
at continuing firms.
3.3 Results
The BPWS results provide estimates of the impact of industry shutdown rates on worker
layoffs with an additional selection control for whether a firm is active or not. Table 7
presents estimation coefficients for the probability of a permanent layoff when controlling
for firm shutdown selection effects for men while Table 8 provides estimation coefficients
for women.
The descriptive statistics illustrate that there is substantial variation in the shutdown
rates across industry and time. Therefore, the impact of industry shutdown rates on per-
manent layoffs should be well-identified. A likelihood ratio test reveals that selection is
statistically significant in all cases for men and three out of five cases for women. The
exceptional cases are women at large and extra large firms. Therefore, selection via the
impact of firm shutdown affects the probability of permanent layoff on a worker. Most of
the discussion emphasizes the variable of interest, industry shutdown rates.
With the exception of women at small-sized firms, the coefficient on the shutdown rate
is positive for both men and women across the firm size classes. Thus, these estimates
indicate that the impact of industry shutdown rates on worker layoff rates are positive.
Figure 2 provides estimated marginal effects of an increase in industry shutdown rate on
the probability of a worker layoff across the firm size classes. For comparison, this figure
also provides the estimated marginal effect without accounting for selection.8 For both
men and women, these quantitative impacts of the industry shutdown rate on permanent
layoff probability change when accounting for selection. After controlling for selection,
the results for men indicate that a 1% increase in industry shutdown rate causes between
0.04 and 0.14% increase in the probability of a permanent layoff. For women, the marginal
effects vary across the firm size classes; a 1% increase in industry shutdown rates implies
(i) a 0.01% decrease in the probability of a permanent layoff at extra small-sized firms and
(ii) a 0.11, 0.03, 0.01, and 0.05% increase in the probability of a permanent layoff at small-,
medium-, large-, and extra large-sized firms, respectively.
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Table 7 Bivariate probability of permanent layoff: men
XS S M L XL All firms
Shutdown rate 1.1319 1.1781 1.3252 1.0205 .9667 .7368
(.6124)a (.6890)a (.5541)b (.6317) (.3721)c (.3935)a
Lag of earnings −.0892 −.1124 −.1181 −.1251 −.1192 −.1179
(.0056)c (.0058)c (.0114)c (.0163)c (.0131)c (.0102)c
Age 35–49 −.0488 .0717 .0905 .0880 .0658
(.0067)c (.0127)c (.0127)c (.0181)c (.0151)c (.0110)c
Age 50+ .0393 .1765 .2456 .2804 .2712 .2292
(.0196)b (.0237)c (.0293)c (.0432)c (.0366)c (.0299)c
Married −.1877 −.1368 −.1229 −.1112 −.0987 −.1270
(.0058)c (.0069)c (.0078)c (.0075)c (.0095)c (.0098)c
Tenure −.1489 −.1362 −.1316 −.1237 −.1005 −.1320
(.0104)c (.0128)c (.0176)c (.0193)c (.0101)c (.0153)c
Tenure squared .0045 .0039 .0039 .0038 .0028 .0039
(.0004)c (.0005)c (.0006)c (.0007)c (.0003)c (.0005)c
Union .1571 .2080 .2045 .1980 .1548 .1551
(.0247)c (.0357)c (.0440)c (.0552)c (.0536)c (.0693)b
Atlantic .3809 .3096 .2920 .3091 .2318 .3213
(.0391)c (.0268)c (.0257)c (.0340)c (.0431)c (.0249)c
Quebec .1292 .0978 .0748 .0576 –.0432 .0831
(.0322)c (.0216)c (.0153)c (.0210)c (.0215)b (.0180)c
Prairie −.1128 −.0512 −.0246 .0142 −.0050 −.0194
(.0175)c (.0089)c (.0136)a (.0195) (.0315) (.0118)
BC .0600 .0701 .0643 .0238 .0190 .0630
(.0341)a (.0192)c (.0195)c (.0384) (.0393) (.0247)b
Constant −.1237 .0308 .0824 .2450 .2227 .1455
(.1161) (.0823) (.1102) (.1658) (.1542) (.1158)
Firm active estimates—exclusion restrictions
log RERjt −.1108 −.0573 .0657 −.1671 −.1428 −.0523
(.0526)b (.0800) (.1665) (.2014) (.9003) (.1162)
logwage billikjt .4065 .1746 .1184 .1228 .3395 .2850
(.0146)c (.0296)c (.0418)c (.0361)c (.0349)c (.0167)c
ρ (correlation) −.4272 −.4545 −.463 .8875 .9156 −.0583
(.0638)c (.1736)c (.0474)c (.0127)c (.0239)c (.1657)
LR test χ2 (selection) 34.20 5.02 4.99 555.22 111.34 .1234
p value 0 .025 .025 0 0 .7254
Observation-censored 78,090 32,215 26,554 12,415 5864 155,138
Observations 856,229 1,046,321 1,464,844 1,095,370 2,733,141 7,195,905
log L −385,676.8 −342,000.6 −385,265.8 −217,645.1 −264,097.3 −1,691,035
Note: The reference group is Ontario for region, 25–35 for age, 2005 for year, and Construction for industry. The firm size classes
are (XS) less than 5 employees, (S) 5–19 employees, (M) 20–99 employees, (L) 100–500 employees and (XL) 500+ employees.
Clustered standard errors, in parentheses, account for within industry correlation
a, b, cStatistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively
Returning to Tables 7 and 8, coefficients on the other control variables remain fairly
constant across the firm size classifications and qualitatively identical for men and
women. The probability of a permanent layoff falls with a worker’s income. Tenure effects
are concave in shape. Married workers have a lower probability of permanent layoff sep-
aration, while unionized workers have a higher permanent separation probability. Across
the regions, workers in the Atlantic provinces experience the highest probability of a
permanent layoff, where the lowest permanent layoff separation probability occurs for
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Table 8 Bivariate probability of permanent layoff: women
XS S M L XL All firms
Shutdown rate −.1088 1.2718 .4622 .2457 1.3510 .9273
(.6894) (.5613)b (.3462) (.5169) (.5141)c (.3633)b
Lag of earnings −.0642 −.0847 −.0927 −.0990 −.0893 −.0908
(.0090)c (.0074)c (.0101)c (.0148)c (.0107)c (.0089)c
Age 35–49 −.0572 .0154 .0270 .0434 .0662 .0343
(.0080)c (.0103) (.0114)b (.0132)c (.0125)c (.0093)c
Age 50+ −.0166 .1236 .1524 .1724 .1760 .1379
(.0146) (.0179)c (.0208)c (.0175)c (.0212)c (.0196)c
Married −.1738 −.1159 −.0849 −.0637 −.0310 −.0852
(.0358)c (.0189)c (.0112)c (.0126)c (.0100)c (.0146)c
Tenure −.1015 −.0944 −.0883 −.0806 −.0669 −.0928
(.0080)c (.0055)c (.0046)c (.0052)c (.0056)c (.0052)c
Tenure squared .0026 .0025 .0025 .0025 .0020 .0028
(.0003)c (.0002)c (.0002)c (.0002)c (.0002)c (.0002)c
Union .0775 .1065 .0532 .0199 .0285 .0126
(.0150)c (.0163)c (.0206)c (.0226) (.0285) (.0198)
Atlantic .4349 .3257 .2766 .2587 .1274 .2942
(.0361)c (.0341)c (.0306)c (.0558)c (.0422)c (.0323)c
Quebec .2284 .1508 .0845 .0595 −.0177 .1158
(.0303)c (.0157)c (.0299)c (.0238)b (.0216) (.0253)c
Prairie −.1340 −.0910 −.0517 −.0329 −.0617 −.0764
(.0437)c (.0139)c (.0164)c (.0250) (.0275)b (.0164)c
BC .1163 .1069 .1095 .0566 .0001 .0884
(.0297)c (.0290)c (.0247)c (.0350) (.0337) (.0221)c
Constant −.7691 −.6926 −.4260 −.2235 −.6727 −.6289
(.2024)c (.1446)c (.1328)c (.1794) (.1622)c (.1471)c
Firm active estimates—exclusion restrictions
log RERjt −.1165 .0167 −.0649 −.7401 .0052 −.2341
(.0878) (.1220) (.1802) (.2693)c (.8326) (.0948)b
logwage billikjt .4257 .1833 .1428 .0722 .3200 .3363
(.0201)c (.0493)c (.0411)c (.0376)a (.0511)c (.0248)c
ρ (correlation) −.2913 −.3842 .9171 .5114 .0937 −.0487
(.0764)c (.1698)c (.0091)c (.3475) (.4337) (.1713)
LR test χ2 (selection) 12.89 4.13 739.38 1.44 .05 .0807
p value 0 .042 0 .230 .830 .7764
Observation-censored 80,672 27,214 18,571 8387 4449 139,293
Observations 791,138 806,543 979,833 718,374 1,904,505 5,200,393
log L −339,866.5 −235,821.1 −225,177.8 −128,665.1 −174,849.7 −1,187,556
Note: The reference group is Ontario for region, 25–35 for age, 2005 for year, and construction for industry. The firm size classes
are (XS) less than 5 employees, (S) 5–19 employees, (M) 20–99 employees, (L) 100–500 employees, and (XL) 500+ employees.
Clustered standard errors, in parentheses, account for within industry correlation
a, b, cStatistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively
workers in the Prairie provinces. Tables 7 and 8 also report the coefficients on the log of
the firm’s wage bill and the log of the real exchange rate, which are our exclusion restric-
tion variables in the selection equation. The coefficient on the wage bill variable is always
positive and significant. This result likely captures the effect of firm size on firm sur-
vival as larger firms tend to have higher survival rates. The coefficient on the log of the
real exchange rate varies between negative and positive and is only statistically significant
with a negative value for men at small-sized firms and women at large-sized firms. For
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Fig. 2 Probability of permanent layoff and the effect of selection. Note: The figure provides the marginal
effects of industry shutdown rates on the probability of a permanent layoff for a worker across various size
classes of firms. Selection corresponds to estimates from Tables 7 and 8 for men and women, respectively.
For comparison, no selection are estimates when not accounting for selection effects of continuing or
shutdown of a firm
men, the correlation in the error terms between the two equations is approximately−0.45
in the extra small-, small-, medium-sized firm categories and approximately 0.9 in the
large- and extra large-sized firm categories. A negative correlation implies that a positive
shock to a firm remaining active has a negative impact on the probability of a male worker
being permanently laid off. This correlatation also varies for women across firm size
classes.
4 Earnings transitions—intensivemargin
The previous section discusses permanent layoffs or the extensive margin of employ-
ment. In this section, we discuss workers earnings transitions or the intensive margins
of permanent layoffs by looking at the earnings growth for those workers experiencing a
permanent layoff. We do not use the identification strategy found in Abowd et al. (1999),
where the worker and firm fixed effects enter additively. The LWF allows us to follow the
worker transitions from a separation (layoff ) to possible employment to a another firm.
Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) provide motivation for using transitions. They show the
estimated worker and firm fixed effects from the log-linear wage equation do not directly
identify the underlying worker skill and firm productivity heterogeneity. In particular, the
correlation between the estimated worker and firm fixed effects does not identify sorting
in the matching between worker skill and firm productivity.
4.1 Earnings and selection
Similar to the previous selection problem, the estimated earnings growth model must
account for selection effects due to firm shutdown. To deal with this selection problem, we
estimate the effect of the transitions on the change in log wage using a Heckman-selection
model. Again, the selection equation describes the probability of a firm continuing
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(
FS∗kjt
)
, while the outcome equation describes the log wage
(
lnw∗ikjt
)
of a specific
transition:
FS∗ikjt = αFS + βFSSRjt + γ FSBit +
J∑
j=1
ψFSj Ij +
2002∑
t=1993
δFSt Dt + λZkjt + vikjt ,
 logw∗ikjt = αw + βwSRjt + γ wBit +
J∑
j=1
ψwj Ij +
2002∑
t=1993
δwt Dt + uikjt . (5)
where  lnwikjt is wage growth of worker i from firm k in industry j at time t and the
errors uikjt and vikjt are normally distributed with zero means and correlation ρ. The
other variables are defined as in the BPWS model from Eq. 2. The analysis examines
wage growth as a way to control for potentially unobservable factors. For example, there
may be wages differentials due to job risk, education, or occupations with higher layoff
rates. The analysis includes industry, location, and firm size variables which partially cap-
ture some of these differentials. Further, these unobservable-time invariant worker or job
characteristics are unlikely to affect wage growth. Dostie (2005) and Abowd et al. (2005)
show unobserved heterogeneity affects the level of lnwikjt . However, the analysis of wage
growth,  lnwikjt , differences out time invariant factors and, thus, removes these unob-
servable variables. In contrast to the BPWSmodel, the exclusion restriction only includes
the firm-to-industry relative wage (logwage billikjt). The specification does not include
the relative real exchange rate as an exclusion restriction. Campa and Goldberg (2001)
show an impact of the real exchange rate on wages, which justifies this change from the
previous worker separation analysis.
Tables 9 and 10 present the coefficient estimates for the earnings regression account-
ing for selection effects for men and women, respectively. The selection parameter (λ) is
significant for all size classes except small- and large-sized firm categories for men and
small- and extra large-sized firm categories for women.9 This result is due to the small
correlation (ρ) between the two equations. For comparison purposes, Fig. 3 provides coef-
ficient estimates on the industry shutdown variable for the selection and non-selection
models. For men, the coefficient on the industry shutdown rate variable becomes posi-
tive and statistically significant for workers at medium-sized firms, while the coefficients
remain negative, statistically significant and increase slightly in magnitude for workers
at other size classes when moving from the non-selection to the selection model. For
women, there is no change in the qualitative findings and little change in the quantitative
effects of the industry shutdown rate after accounting for selection. Thus, the impact of
selection effects of firm shutdown is small when examining worker earnings growth.With
the exception of men at medium-sized firms, the correlation between the error terms
in the two equations, ρ, is positive. Positive correlation indicates that firms with unex-
plained increases in the probability of remaining active also have unexplained increases to
wages paid.
The change in the logarithm of worker wages measures the wage growth for a worker.
Thus, the coefficient on the industry shutdown rate variable gives the response of worker
wage growth to changes in the industry shutdown rate. Equivalently, this coefficient gives
an elasticity or the percentage change in worker earnings in response to a 1% change in the
industry shutdown rate. The estimated coefficient values indicate economic significance
in that worker wage growth is highly responsive to industry shutdown rates. For men,
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Table 9 Earnings regression with selection: men
XS S M L XL All firms
Shutdown rate −.9794 −1.3430 −3.0549 −.5340 −1.3538
(.7858) (1.0124)b (1.1623) (1.0471)c (1.0941) (.7210)a
Age 35–49 −.0737 −.0742 −.0661 −.0904 −.0751
(.0195)c (.0161)c (.0202)c (.0169)c (.0168)c (.0098)c
Age 50+ −.1820 −.1965 −.2107 −.2139 −.2429 −.2135
(.0346)c (.0207)c (.0251)c (.0304)c (.0277)c (.0187)c
Married −.0065 .0414 .0917 .0033 .0390 .0221
(.0172) (.0179)b (.0337)c (.0139) (.0260) (.0126)a
Tenure −.1236 −.1629 −.1200 −.1437 −.1270 −.1406
(.0153)c (.0121)c (.0060)c (.0172)c (.0119)c (.0107)c
Tenure squared .0055 .0075 .0069 .0055 .0042 .0054
(.0008)c (.0006)c (.0004)c (.0008)c (.0006)c (.0005)c
Union .1109 .1224 .0589 .1051 .0704 .0772
(.0206)c (.0256)c (.0199)c (.0277)c (.0290)b (.0130)c
Atlantic .1431 .1096 −.1151 .0734 −.1065
(.0233)c (.0155)c (.0542)b (.0443)a (.0601) (.0325)c
Quebec .0231 .0058 −.0907 .0154 −.0046 .0220
(.0253) (.0202) (.0285)c (.0211) (.0383) (.0198)
Prairie .0350 .0296 −.1011 .0276 .0432
(.0198)a (.0186) (.0348) (.0210)c (.0317) (.0161)c
BC −.0444 −.1370 −.0089 −.0461 −.0226
(.0257)a (.0249)a (.0547)b (.0334) (.0424) (.0204)
Firm active estimates—exclusion restrictions
logwage billikjt .4872 .2657 .1091 .1053 .4938 .3989
(.0217)c (.0435)c (.0485)b (.0721) (.0698)c (.0205)c
ρ (correlation) .0956 .0052 −.6605 .0138 .0683 .0396
(.0213)c (.0346) (.0753)c (.0393) (.0193)c (.0120)c
σ (variance) 1.2316 1.2336 1.3537 1.197 1.2076 1.2191
(.0182)c (.0215)c (.0932)c (.0381)c (.0439)c (.0286)c
λ (selection) 1176 .0065 −.8942 .0165 .0824 .0483
(.0263)c (.0426) (.1624)c (.0354) (.0219)c (.0143)c
Observations 104,317 64,708 68,134 36,100 36,352 309,611
Observation-censored 81,178 31,112 25,081 11,738 5416 154,525
log L −82,747.59 −107,003.9 −57,477.46 −59,985.37 −433,093.5
Note: The reference group is Ontario for region, 25–35 for age, 2005 for year, and construction for industry. The firm size classes
are (XS) less than 5 employees, (S) 5–19 employees, (M) 20–99 employees, (L) 100–500 employees, and (XL) 500+ employees.
Clustered standard errors, in parentheses, account for within industry correlation
a, b, cStatistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively
extra small-sized firms show the least response of wage growth to industry shutdown
rates with a coefficient of −0.98, while men at large-sized firms have the most response
with a coefficient of −3.05. For women, workers at the extra small-sized firms have the
largest response as the coefficient estimate indicates a 1% increase in industry shutdown
rate causes a 3% decrease in worker wage growth.
The coefficients on the other variables indicate similar patterns across firm size classes
and genders. Earnings growth falls with age and rise with beingmarried or part of a union-
ized firm. The effect of job tenure is nonlinear. Wage growth initially falls with tenure
but begins to rise after approximately 11 years at a job. We investigate worker earnings
while controlling for the possible association of the firm size class with the worker earning
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Table 10 Earnings regression with selection: women
XS S M L XL All firms
Shutdown rate −3.4041 .1620 −1.8604 −2.0460 −.9859 −1.3759
(1.4500)b (.8545) (1.3127) (1.8356) (1.0292) (.9488)
Age 35–49 −.0556 −.0321 −.0328 −.0728 −.0475
(.0343) (.0257) (.0235)a (.0296) (.0239)c (.0101)c
Age 50+ −.2370 −.1923 −.3059 −.3178 −.3306 −.2710
(.0328)c (.0441)c (.0392)c (.0419)c (.0555)c (.0285)c
Married −.0207 .0394 .0363 .0494 .0267 .0293
(.0242) (.0158)b (.0270) (.0248)b (.0262) (.0103)c
Tenure −.1648 −.1966 −.2136 −.1722 −.1555 −.1747
(.0204)c (.0202)c (.0131)c (.0188)c (.0129)c (.0106)c
Tenure squared .0068 .0088 .0095 .0061 .0054 .0067
(.0009)c (.0012)c (.0008)c (.0011)c (.0006)c (.0005)c
Union .1523 .0486 .0450 .1302 .0540 .0719
(.0552)c (.0911) (.0682) (.0393)c (.0334) (.0383)a
Atlantic .2317 .1793 .1750 .2020 .1494 .1805
(.0392)c (.0422)c (.0647)c (.0684)c (.0552)c (.0340)c
Quebec .1129 .0569 .0349 .0904 .1160 .0698
(.0338)c (.0392) (.0339) (.0436)b (.0343)c (.0234)c
Prairie .0328 −.0049 .0548 .0678 .0732 .0353
(.0533) (.0475) (.0328)a (.0628) (.0453) (.0268)
BC .0372 .0312 −.0467 .00007 −.0238 −.0052
(.0422) (.0295) (.0361) (.0777) (.0501) (.0252)
Firm active estimates—exclusion restrictions
logwage billikjt .4743 .2943 .1818 .1116 .5411 .4460
(.0148)c (.0460)c (.0768)c (.0736) (.0635)c (.0232)c
ρ (correlation) .0762 .0167 .0563 .0876 0038 .0314
(.0422)a (.0532) (.0441) (.0354)b (.0589) (.0296)
σ (variance) 1.3042 1.3157 1.3280 1.3296 1.3249 1.3250
(.0293)c (.0329)c (.0377)c (.0170)c (.0238)c (.0222)c
λ (selection) .0998 .0232 .0748 .1165 .0051 .0416
(.0557)a (.0699) (.0581)a (.0476)b (.0781) (.0394)
Observations 94,357 40,953 33,713 17,267 18,628 204,918
Observation-censored 82,961 26,855 17,872 8093 4117 139,898
log L −48,767.82 −48,280.89 −48,160.96 −26,165.28 −30,879.39 −222,421.9
Note: The reference group is Ontario for region, 25–35 for age, 2005 for year, and construction for industry. The firm size classes
are (XS) less than 5 employees, (S) 5–19 employees, (M) 20–99 employees, (L) 100–500 employees, and (XL) 500+ employees.
Clustered standard errors, in parentheses, account for within industry correlation
a, b, cStatistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively
changes. There are two potential reasons for a worker’s firm size class to change. First, the
worker moves to a different firm belonging to a different size class. Second, the worker
stays at the same firm, but the firm moves to a different firm size class. Since we look at
workers experiencing a permanent layoff, our analysis focuses on the group of workers
moving to a different firm. This analysis demonstrates whether a layoff necessarily results
in a worse situation for a worker. We examine the impact of firm size class switches on the
earnings of laid-off workers since firm size provides a clear dimension for improvement
in worker’s earnings. Oi and Idson (1999) document that larger firms pay higher wages.
Therefore, workers experiencing a layoff but moving to firms in larger size classes may
actually see their wages increase.10
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Fig. 3  logwikjt and the effect of selection. Note: The figure provides the marginal effects of industry
shutdown rates on the probability of a permanent layoff for a worker across various size classes of firms.
Selection corresponds to estimates from Tables 9 and 10 for men and women, respectively. For comparison,
no selection are estimates when not accounting for selection effects of continuing or shutdown of a firm
Figure 4 presents the probability distribution function (PDF) for log(wageikjt) for
thosemen and women, respectively, who experience a permanent layoff but move to a dif-
ferent firm. Each figure shows CDFs for three subgroups: (i) switch down—worker moves
to a firm in a smaller size class; (ii) switch to same size—worker moves to a firm in the
same size class; and (iii) switch up—worker moves to a firm in a larger size class. For both
men and women, the wage growth PDFs for the switch down, switch to the same size,
and switch up are left, middle, and right, respectively. These figures indicate that work-
ers who transition to larger sized firms do better than workers who move to a firm in the
same size class, while workers who move to smaller sized firms do worse. An asymmetry
results when comparing the distributions across the three groups. For negative values of
wage growth, the lower tail for the switch down group of workers is much fatter than for
the other two groups, while the lower tail looks similar for the switch to same size and
switch up groups. For positive values of wage growth, the opposite occurs. The distribu-
tion switch down and switch to same size groups have similar upper tails while the switch
up group has a fatter upper tail.
This unconditional analysis ignores the rich characteristics of firms and workers. So,
we amend the wage model with selection (5) to include the firm size class switches. The
switchers are treated as exogenous as we focus only on involuntary separations or perma-
nent layoffs. The following specification combines workers experiencing a firm size class
switch with the selection wage model:
FS∗ikjt = αFS+βFSSRjt+γ FSBit+
J∑
j=1
ψFSj Ij+
2002∑
t=1993
δFSt Dt+λZkjt+
∑
i∈m
ηFSSWit+vikjt ,
 logw∗ikjt = αw + βwSRjt + γ wBit +
J∑
j=1
ψwj Ij +
2002∑
t=1993
δwt Dt +
∑
i∈m
ηwSWit + uikjt . (6)
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Fig. 4 Unconditional probability distribution of  logwikjt . Note: This graph illustrates the unconditional
growth rate of wages ( logwikjt ) for male (top graph) and female (bottom graph) workers who experienced a
permanent layoff and found a new job. The following three lines are for groups of workers: (1) transition to a
smaller size firm (switch down), (2) transition to a larger size firm (switch up), and (3) transition to a same size
firm
where SWit is a series of indicator variables for individuals across various firm size
transitions between time t − 1 and t and ηw is the corresponding coefficients on the
indicator variables. Firm size transition classes, m, are: (i) extra small to small (XS–S);
(ii) small to extra small (S–XS); (iii) small to small (S–S); (iv) small to medium (S–
M); (v) medium to small (M–S); (vi) medium to medium (M–M); (vii) medium to large
(M–L); (viii) large to medium (L–M); (ix) large to large (L–L); (x) large to extra large
(L–XL); (xi) extra large to large (XL–L); and (xii) extra large to extra large (XL–XL).
Table 11 provides estimates for the earnings regressions controlling for firm size class
changes. Industry shutdown rate continues to have a negative impact on worker earn-
ings even with the additional control for switching firm size class. The coefficients on the
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Table 11 Earnings switcher regression with selection: pooled
Male Female
Shutdown rate −1.2943 −.9074
(.6875)a (.9686)
XS–S .2229 .1779
(.0228)c (.0224)c
S–XS −.1983 −.1368
(.0141)c (.0399)c
S–S .0311 .0496
(.0241) (.0329)
S–M .1259 .0597
(.0276)c (.0354)a
M–S −.0593 −.0292
(.0227)c (.0471)
M–M .0529 .0370
(.0153)c (.0506)
M–L .1111 .0912
(.0247)c (.0447)b
L–M −.0615 −.0133
(.0165)c (.0577)
L–L .0627 .0714
(.0211)c (.0442)
L–XL .0832 .0478
(.0276)c (.0475)
XL–L −.0348 .1104
(.0242) (.0685)
XL–XL .0206 .0695
(.0177) (.0369)a
logwage billikjt .2795 .3215
(.0180)c (.0316)c
ρ (correlation) .0208 .0314
(.0155) (.0420)
σ (variance) 1.1546 1.2967
(.0313)c (.0288)c
λ (selection) .0240 .0408
(.0180)a (.0547)
Observations 164,659 89,450
Observations (Censored) 60,750 48,027
log L −288,496.2 −139,451.6
Note: The reference group is Ontario for region, 25–35 for age, 2005 for year, and construction for industry. The firm size classes
are (XS) less than 5 employees, (S) 5–19 employees, (M) 20–99 employees, (L) 100–500 employees, and (XL) 500+ employees.
Clustered standard errors, in parentheses, account for within industry correlation
a, b, cStatistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively
switching variables have the expected sign. An increase in the firm size class of a worker
sees the worker’s earnings increase, while a decrease in firm size class sees the worker’s
earnings fall.
Switching from extra small- to small-sized firm causes wages to increase by 0.22% for
men and 0.18% for women. The magnitude is not as great in the reverse direction as
switching from small- to an extra small-sized firms causes earnings for men to fall by
0.20% and women earnings to fall by 0.14%. A movement from medium- to large-sized
firms causes earnings of men to increase by 0.11% and earnings of women to increase
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by 0.09%, while a movement from large- to medium-sized firms causes the earnings of
men and women to fall by 0.06 and 0.01%, respectively. Those workers not changing
firm size class generally do not see changes in their earnings. The exceptions to this rule
are men at medium- and large-sized firms who see a statistically significant increase in
earnings of 6%.
Figure 5 present the PDFs of the residuals from the regressions in Table 11 for men and
women. As in Fig. 4, these workers are broken into three categories based on pre-layoff
to post-layoff size class transition of their firms. The conditioning removes a significant
amount of the difference between the distributions across the three categories. Further,
the asymmetries at the tails of the distributions across the three categories disappear after
Fig. 5 Conditional probability distribution of  logwikjt . Note: This graph illustrates the conditional growth
rate of wages ( logwikjt ) for male (top graph) and female (bottom graph) workers who experienced a
permanent layoff and found a new job. The following three lines are for groups of workers: (1) transition to a
smaller size firm (switch down), (2) transition to a larger size firm (switch up), and (3) transition to a same size
firm. The residual wage growth is generated by the Heckman selection model (6) and results in Table 11
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the conditioning. A worker does not necessarily end up in a worse position with a lower
earning job after being permanently laid off. However, almost 60% of those laid-off work-
ers who move to smaller or similarly sized firms see a fall in wages. In contrast, less than
50% of laid-off workers eventually moving to a larger sized firm see their earnings fall.
Thus, the type of firm a worker ends up at after being laid off explains a significant amount
of the resulting wages.
5 Conclusions
We quantify the effect of industry shutdown rates on worker outcomes such as invol-
untary separations or permanent layoffs (extensive margin) and wage earnings (intensive
margin). Our empirical work shows that when controlling for individual- and firm-
specific characteristics, industry shutdown rates generally have a positive and significant
effect on the probability of a permanent worker layoff. For wage growth, shutdown rates
have a negative effect but the effects are amplified for workers in smaller firms. The
unique structure of the LWF database allows us to differentiate among different industries
in our analysis. We find substantial differences across industries in the roles of individual-
and firm-level attributes on permanent layoff and wage growth. Our analysis controls
for firm selection effects on worker outcomes due to firm shutdown. Accounting for
selection effects does alter the estimated impact of industry shutdown rates on worker
outcomes.
Determining the relative contribution of worker, firm, industry, and time factors to the
overall employment instability is an essential step in developing training programs to
counter the adverse effects of employment loss. If job instability is mostly determined
by differences in individual human capital, then future policies may focus on providing
opportunities for workers to improve their education or skills. If, on the other hand, job
instability is mostly a reflection of industry conditions or, more specifically, firm shut-
down within an industry, then education and skill development programs may not be as
effective. Hence, understanding the relative impact of individual and firm characteris-
tics on worker turnover is important in determining the effectiveness of specific training
and skill-development programs provided both privately and publicly. In the light of the
recent economic downturn that affected many Western countries including Canada, the
costs and benefits associated with such programs are likely to remain subject to intense
policy discussions in the foreseeable future. Our estimates of the impact of industry shut-
down rates on earnings growth is line with other papers that focus on uncertainty and
variability such as Gathmann et al. (2017).
These results demonstrate the necessity of the joint analysis of firm shutdown with
either permanent layoff or worker wages. Industry shutdown rates provide a measure of
turbulence and firm turnover within an industry. Without controlling for firm selection,
the analysis ignores a major portion of workers and firms. Higher industry shutdown
rates suggest more turbulence within an industry. Substantial hiring and firing costs lead
to a desire by continuing firms to keep and not lay off their workers. These costs fac-
tor into a firm’s choice to continue operations or shutdown. Higher hiring and firing
costs within an industry also factor into a firm’s choice between temporary shutdown or
permanent exit.
Controlling for a firm’s shutdown probability allows the industry shutdown rate to
fully capture industry turnover which leads to the positive correlation between industry
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shutdown and the permanent worker layoff rate. This finding complements the work by
Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012) who document that the negative correlation between
net job creation rates and the unemployment rate is larger for small firms versus
large firms.
Job turnover has a rich set of dynamics that cannot necessarily be explored with
reduced-formmethods. As suggested by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006), they highlight the
role for modeling job turnover using frictional models of unemployment. In thesemodels,
job turnover is a dynamic process that involves explicitly laying out the microfoundations.
However, there is an important opportunity for further research on voluntary separa-
tions or a worker quitting their job to find a new one. Recent work by Lise et al. (2016)
allows for matched agents to undertake on-the-job search and illustrates the complex-
ity of labor outcomes in terms employment prospects and earnings. A fruitful extension
would consider both involuntary and voluntary quits.
Endnotes
1Work in this literature is driven by collection of administrative data, which usually
have restricted access. For example, a recent study by Song et al. (2015) shows that rising
labor earnings dispersion in the USA is driven by increasing wage dispersion across firms
and not by changes to within firm wage dispersion. Haltiwanger et al. (2006) provide a
broad overview.
2Morissette (2004), Morissette R et al. (2007) and Morissette et al. (2013) use the LWF
database to investigate permanent layoffs and worker reallocation.
3 Job instability has wide ranging financial and other consequences for individuals and
families (Jacobson et al. (1993); Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) Gottschalk and Moffitt
(2009); Beach et al. (2003); Morissette and Ostrovsky (2005)). Often, it signals high earn-
ings uncertainty, which may, in turn, lead to lower consumption Browning and Lusardi
(1996) and alter family savings and labor supply decisions (Pistaferri (2003)). It may also
affect families’ schooling and occupational choices (Guiso et al. (2002)) and even their
fertility behavior (Fraser (2001)).
4We perform separate analysis on men and women as labor market decisions and out-
comes are likely to differ; see Killingsworth and Heckman (1987), Loprest (1992), and
Altonji and Blank (1999), inter alia.
5We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this salient feature.
6 This NAICS coding is partially due to retro-coding by Statistics Canada.
7 Results are available upon request.
8 The coefficients on the other variables are quite similar for the models with and with-
out a firm selection control. A complete set of estimates for the model with no control for
selection are available from the authors upon request.
9 In a full-information maximum likelihood estimation, the selection parameter is a
function of correlation and variance (σ ) or λ = ρ × σ .
10Other dimensions to look at when investigating worker earnings following layoffs
include workers moving to new occupations or industries. Our dataset does not include
information regarding worker occupation. Further, there is no clear direction to the
change in worker earnings when moving to a new industry or occupation unlike moving
to larger firms.
11A T4 form closely resembles a W-2 form in the USA.
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Appendix
Construction of Longitudinal Worker File
Statistics Canada constructs the LWF database from four data sources. The first data
source in the LWF is the T4 Supplementary Tax File, which is a random sample of all
individuals who received a T4 supplementary tax form and filed a tax return. A T4 sup-
plementary tax form is issued by an employer to each employee for any earnings that
either exceed a certain threshold or trigger income tax, Canada/Quebec Pension Plan
(C/QPP), or unemployment insurance premiums. It contains information about the earn-
ings received from an employer in a given year, tax deducted, pension contributions,
union dues, and other information.
The second data source is the Record of Employment (ROE), which includes employer
provided information on separations and their reasons. Canadian employers are by law
required to provide such information for any separation. A detailed list of reasons for
separations includes voluntary and involuntary separations such as the shortage of work,
labor dispute, injury or illness, quit, pregnancy and parental leaves, retirement, and
other reasons. The third data source is the Longitudinal Employment Analysis Program
(LEAP). Statistics Canada constructs and maintains the LEAP database. This database
includes information about the size of the employee’s firm and tracks employees who
move from one firm to another. The LEAP database covers the entire Canadian econ-
omy and includes firms (but not establishments) with at least one dollar in annual payroll.
The key information that comes from the LEAP is the firm’s employment derived from
its payroll using average labor units (ALU). LEAP tracks employees who move from one
firm to another. Statistics Canada constructs LEAP, and by extension the LWF database,
to handle mergers and acquisitions in a retrospective manner. Suppose two firms, A and
B, merge in year t to create firm C. Within the database prior to year t, a synthetic his-
tory for firm C is created by aggregating information from firms A and B, so that only
firm C’s information appears in the database. Thus, identification of a firm’s exit or shut-
down imply these are not due to merger activity. The final data source is personal income
tax files (T1), which add demographic variables such as age, sex, family status, and area
of residence. They also provide information about individuals’ income sources other than
T4 earnings.
Our data was constructed by using information from the LEAP to classify firm entries
and shutdowns and to compute industry-specific shutdown rates. Identification of firm
entries and shutdowns is based on firm payroll transitions from 1 year to the next one. A
firm’s entry year is the first year; the firm has a positive payroll.We identify firm shutdown
in year t when a firm has zero payroll in year t but positive payroll in year t−1. Thus, entry
year is not identifiable for firms existing in 1991 or the first year of the LEAP database,
while firm shutdown is not identifiable in 2008 or the last year of the database. Further,
LEAP includes NAICS codes for firms from 1992 and onwards. Consequently, NAICS
industry-specific shutdown rates can be computed only from 1992 to 2007.
We proceed by extracting individual data from the LWF. Since NAICS codes in the
LWF are available only from 1992, we used the LWF data from 1992 to 2008. We kept
men and women aged 24 to 64. Total earnings in year 4t were defined as individual’s total
annual paid employment income (wages and salaries) computed from all T4 forms issued
to the individual in year t. All earnings are adjusted to 2007 constant dollars using the
Consumer Price Index for Canada. For individuals who held multiple jobs in a given year,
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we then retained only the characteristics of main jobs defined as jobs with the highest T4
amount in that year.11 To each individual record in the LWF, we added industry-specific
shutdown rates bymatching firm identifiers in the LWF to those in the LEAP.We excluded
individuals who died and whose employer’s industry classification was unknown.
Next, individual employer-employee records from the LWF are matched to industry
price information available for the period from 1987 to 2007. US industry prices are taken
from Industry Economic Accounts tables available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
US Department of Commerce (Chain-Type Price Indexes for Gross Output by Indus-
try series). Canadian industry price indexes are computed from the information on gross
output and real gross output, by industry (Statistics Canada CANSIM series 383-0022).
Although both the US andCanadian industry price indexes are based on theNorthAmerican
Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes, there are some differences between the
industries available in each series. We identified 42 industries for which a direct corre-
spondence between the two series could be established. Excluded are primarily industries
that are most likely to be represented by the public sector, such as, for instance, public
administration, education and healthcare. Three industries (“petroleum and coal product
manufacturing,” “pipeline transportation,” and “waste management”) had to be excluded
because of insufficient sample size. Therefore, our final sample includes 39 industry cat-
egories. The list of included industries is given in Table 1. Finally, the LWF records are
also matched to annual Canada/US nominal exchange rates necessary to produce real
exchange rates used in the study. The rates used in the study are from the G.5 Foreign
Exchange Rates series provided by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(Series ID: EXCAUS).
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